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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The German Aktiengesetz of 1965, as amended, contains a
number of provisions which govern the situation of public
companies (Aktiengesellschaften) in a group of companies.
These comprise paragraphs 15-21 AktG which contain a
number of provisions concerning affiliated enterprises
(affiliated enterprises) (verbundene Unternehmen) as well as
paragraphs 291-328 AktG which contain further and
frequently detailed provisions governing such
undertakings.  Certain of the provisions contained in
paragraphs 15-21 and 291-328 AKk affect private
companies, because they mention an Unternehmen, which
includes such companies.  There has been a considerable
amount of academic discussion concerning the position of
private companies (Geseltschaften mit beschränkter Haftung) in
a group of companies, and the Second Senate of the
German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) has
made a number of important decisions governing the
position of private companies in such a group in recent
years; these decisions have involved a considerable change
in the approach taken to this matter.
According to paragraph 18(1) sentence 1 AktG, if a
controlling and one or more dependent undertakings are
brought under uniform management (einheitliche Leitung),
they are treated as forming a group.  Companies between
which are integrated with one another (paragraph 319
AktG), are treated as being under uniform management
(einheitliche Leitung) (para 18(1) sentence 2 AktG).
Furthermore, controlling and dependent enterprises are
deemed to form a group (para 18(1) sentence 3 AktG).
The concept of uniform management seems as much an
economic as a legal one:  enterprises would, it seems, be
treated as being under uniform management if the
controlling one determined policy guidelines for the
enterprise dependent on it to follow.
A de facto group is one which is not governed by a control
contract between a controlling enterprise and those
dependent on it.  The term qualified de facto group
(qualifizierte faktische Konzerne) used to be used to denote
groups in which it was not possible to isolate particular
prejudicial measures taken by the controlling enterprise
and to calculate the compensation due in relation to them
in accordance with the usual rules attributable to de facto
groups.  The qualified de facto group has been otherwise
defined as existing when the subsidiary company has lost
its independence to the extent that it is reduced to the
position of a mere branch of the controlling one.  Finally,
it has also been treated as existing where the continued
harmful damage to the interests of the subsidiary company
is such as to indicate that the controlling company has no
regard for the former company’s interest.  
The first of the three proposed  definitions appears to be
the preferable one.  However, the Supreme Court has
abandoned the use of the concept of the qualified de facto
group in its recent decisions, and has replaced it with the
concept of the existence of liability for acts by a dominant
shareholder which threaten the continued existence of a
subsidiary company (existenzvernichtender Eingriff).  The
latter approach places emphasis on the legal rules
concerning the maintenance of capital.  This new approach
was first taken by the Supreme Court in Bremer Vulkan
(BGHZ 149, 10), which has been followed in a number of
recent cases.
The creative activity of the Supreme Court has been
rendered necessary by reason of the fact that there is no
codified German law concerning contractual or de facto
groups in which a private company is the dependent
company.  The government draft project of 1973
(Regierungsentwurf) paragraphs 230 et seq of which were
intended to introduce such legal provisions was never
adopted.  It underwent considerable academic criticism,
and its failure to be adopted was also influenced by the
vicissitudes of coalition politics.  The rules governing
contractual or de facto groups, in which a private company
is the dependent company, have largely been made by the
courts.
CONTROL CONTRACTS AND THE PRIVATE
COMPANY
A control contract involving a GmbH as the dependent
party may be drawn up, but a similar relationship with a
controlling enterprise to that established by a control
contract may come about as the result of a suitable
provision in the private company’s articles.  It is
questionable what majority is required for such a GmbH to
give its consent to a control contract.  It is sometimes
argued that the unanimous consent of the shareholders in
the general meeting of the GmbH is necessary, whilst it has
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also been contended that the same majority as that which
is necessary for the alteration of the GmbH’s articles is all
that is necessary, ie three quarters of the votes cast at a
general meeting.  The contract must be drawn up as a deed
and be duly registered.  If the controlling enterprise is also
a GmbH its agreement to the contract must be given by
means of a resolution of its general meeting.
If a GmbH is the dependent party to a control contract, the
controlling enterprise may give instructions to it which
may prove disadvantageous, provided that they are in the
interests of the controlling enterprise or other enterprises
in the same group.  The controlling enterprise is also
required to pay compensation for any net annual loss
suffered by the dependent company, and appears to be
obliged to acquire the shares of any minority
(aussenstehenden) shareholder upon demand by such
shareholder (see paragraphs 302 and 305 AktG, which are
treated as applicable by way of analogy).
GmbHs are more likely to be dependent companies in a de
facto group of companies rather than in a contractual one.
This is largely because in a GmbH, the shareholders have
the power to give instructions to managers in accordance
with paragraphs 37(1) and 45(1) GmbHG and control
contracts are not necessary for this purpose.  There may
however be tax advantages in making use of the contractual
group in which a private company is the dependent
company. The use of private companies in a group of
companies is sometimes facilitated by the fact that their
shareholders may be given multiple voting rights, which is
impossible in a public company.
THE GMBH AS A DEPENDENT COMPANY
IN A DE FACTO GROUP
The Aktiengesetz contains detailed provisions in paragraphs
311-18 thereof concerning the liability of controlling
enterprises to dependent public companies in the absence
of a control contract.  It does not seem that it has been
generally thought appropriate to apply these provisions by
way of analogy to govern the position of dependent private
companies in a de facto group.  The Second Chamber of the
Federal Supreme Court has decided a number of cases
concerning the protection of shareholders and creditors in
such groups.  It has made use of the concept of the qualified
de facto group in its jurisprudence concerning creditor
protection, but it appears to have abandoned this approach
recently.  One of its most important decisions concerning
minority protection was the ITT case (BGHZ 65, 15).
In the above case ITT, a large multinational undertaking
based overseas, which was the majority shareholder in a
private company which was itself a member of a private
company limited partnership (GmbH & Co KG), induced
the private company and one of its subsidiaries to conclude
a contract for services with a subsidiary of the large
multinational company ITT, according to which the private
company and its subsidiary were required to contribute
one per cent of their annual turnover to the subsidiary of
ITT.  A minority shareholder in the GmbH brought an
action against ITT on behalf of the GmbH & Co KG for
recovery of the sums wrongly paid to the subsidiary of ITT.
The Second Chamber found in favour of the minority
shareholder.  It based its finding on the breach of the duty
of good faith owed by the 85 per cent majority shareholder
to the minority shareholder.  The majority shareholder had
put pressure on the management of the private company to
act in a way detrimental to the minority shareholder.
Shareholders in a private company owe duties of good faith
to one another and their company.
The Supreme Court has made a number of decisions
concerning the protection of creditors in a private
company belonging to a de facto group in recent years, and
since its decision in Bremer Vulkan (BGHZ 149, 10) it has
changed the basis of its approach to this matter.  In
Fertinghaus (BGHZ 68, 312), the Eighth Chamber of the
Supreme Court refused to open the corporate veil in order
to enable the creditor of a single member GmbH to receive
payment out of the assets of another company, which gave
instructions to the former undercapitalised GmbH. A
different approach was taken by the Supreme Court in
Autokran (BGHZ 95, 330), which received some criticism
in K. Schmidt’s treatise (Gesellschaftsrecht, 3rd ed, Karl
Heymanns Verlag 2003, pp 1219-20 and 1223).  In this
case, a leasing company had leased 39 cranes to seven
private companies, in all of which the defendant was in
effect the sole shareholder, and was also the sole manager.
The latter person had formed another company which was
responsible for the accounts and financing of the group,
and which entered into factoring contracts with each of the
seven private companies, and took charge of all their cash.
The private companies failed to pay the sum of DM
700,000 to the leasing company in respect of the lease of
the cranes.
The Second Chamber upheld the claim of the leasing
company against the defendant sole shareholder for
payment of the relevant sum.  The court found that the
relevant group of companies could be treated as a qualified
de facto group, because the sole shareholder had organised
it as if its individual members were mere branches, and
used his managerial powers over it in a lasting and
comprehensive manner.  According to the court, in the
particular circumstances the plaintiff had a claim for
reimbursement as the result of the application of
paragraphs 303, 322(2) and (3) AktG buy way of analogy.
The first of these provisions is applicable to de facto groups
in which an Aktiengesellschaft is the dependent company, and
it provides for the protection of creditors in the case of the
cancellation or termination of a control contract or a profit
transfer one.  The other two provisions govern the liability
of a principal company to one integrated with it.
It was also emphasised by the Second Chamber of the
Supreme Court that the finding that a group of companies
was a qualified de facto one only resulted in the22
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presumption that the business of the dependent company
was conducted to further the interests of the group.  The
controlling enterprise might escape liability if it could
demonstrate that a conscientiously (pflichtgemass) acting
manager of an independent private company would not
have carried on the business of the dependent company in
a different way in the given circumstances.
As is pointed out by Kübler and Assmann at page 453 of
their work Gesellschaftsrecht (6th edition,  C F Müller Verlag,
2006), the Supreme Court upheld its decision in Autokran
in Tiefbau (BGHZ 107, 78), but modified its conclusions in
that case to some extent.  In the latter case, the court
somewhat controversially found that a qualified de facto
relationship existed where an enterprise was responsible
for financial control in another one.  The court also held
that paragraph 302 AktG was applicable by way of analogy
in the particular circumstances.  Paragraph 302(1) AktG,
which is applicable to dependent public companies,
provides that in the case of a control or profit transfer
agreement, the other contracting party shall compensate
any annual net loss due to the agreement to the extent that
such loss cannot be compensated for by withdrawing sums
from the profits reserves which were transferred to such
reserves during the course of the agreement.
The decision in Video (BGHZ 115, 187) unsurprisingly
caused considerable controversy.  In that case, the Supreme
Court held that a sole or majority shareholder in a GmbH
who was at the same time a sole manager and who in
addition acted as a sole entrepreneur was liable in
accordance with the rules applicable to the qualified de facto
group.  The court corrected the controversial view that it
had adopted in Video and which was much criticised by
German jurists in TBB (BGHZ 122, 123).  In the latter
case it found that a shareholder who has a dominant
position in a private company will incur liability in
accordance with the rules applicable to the qualified de facto
group if he shows insufficient consideration for the affairs
of the dependent GmbH. The view was adopted by the
court that such lack of consideration could not be
presumed but would first of all have to be shown and
evidenced by the plaintiff.  Insofar as the plaintiff has
inadequate insight into the manner of running the business
of the company, the court found that it is up to the
defendant to explain the relevant matters known to him.  It
held that in a particular case the question whether
payments between different members of the group were
properly entered in the accounts, such that possible
detriment to the dependent private company could be
corrected by a compensatory payment to that company
was of importance.
THE NEW APPROACH TO LIABILITY IN A
DE FACTO GROUP
A new cause of action resulting in unlimited liability for the
managers of a German private company was established by
the German Supreme Court in Bremer Vulkan (BGHZ 149,
10).  In this case, the court held that the protection of a
dependent private company against the wrongful acts of its
shareholders should not be based upon the rules contained
in paragraphs 291-310 AKGG, applicable to contractual
groups, or those contained in paragraphs 311-17 AKGG,
applicable to de facto groups, in which the dependent
company was an AG.  It should rather take place in
conformity with the rules governing the maintenance of
capital and the safeguarding of the continued existence of
the company.
The Supreme Court held that no such consideration was
given when the company was rendered unable to discharge
its debts due to the activities  of its sole shareholder.  It also
found that if the sole shareholder persuaded a dependent
private company to maintain its funds in the central
treasury of a group dominated by that shareholder, it was
obliged to make sure that when disbursements took place
from such funds, proper consideration should be given to
the company’s ability to fulfil its obligations and continue
its existence.  The court found that the action of the sole
shareholder would only result in his liability if the capacity
of the company to satisfy its creditors could not be restored
by the repayment of the share capital which had been lost
to the company in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 31 GmbHG. This somewhat complex text
provides that payments made  by a private company which
infringe the rules contained in paragraph 30 GmbHG
governing the maintenance of capital have to be returned
to the company,.  The same principles would be applicable
if there were several dependent private companies in a de
facto group.
A justification of the new concept governing liability was
given by the German Supreme court in KBV (BGHZ 151,
181), in which the claim for causing insolvency
(exisatenzvernichtenden Eiingrift) provided for in Bremer Vulkan
was accepted.  The Court found that such a claim was
acceptable when a shareholder in a private company
disregarded the required need to consider the preservation
of the assets for the satisfaction of the company’s creditors,
and through  open or concealed withdrawals substantially
prejudiced its capacity to fulfil its obligations.  The court
added that such conduct, which involved a misuse of the
corporate form of the GmbH, would lead to the loss of the
limited liability of the private company provided for in
paragraph 13(2) GmbHG unless the loss suffered by it would
be compensated fully through the application of the rules
governing the maintenance of capital contained in
paragraphs 30 and 31GmbHG. The court found that a
private company may not have a right to its continuance, but
that its termination must take place in as ordered procedure
which guarantees the preferential availability of the property
of the company for the satisfaction of its creditors.
Although it seems that the concept of the qualified de facto
group will no longer be employed by the German courts,
the rules set out in TBB regarding the burden of proof
which have already been explained, still appear to be valid. 23
Amicus Curiae   Issue 81   Spring 2010
24
Amicus Curiae   Issue 81   Spring 2010
The plaintiff is thus required to demonstrate a prejudicial
interference with the company’s assets by shareholder.
The burden is then placed upon the shareholder to show
that his actions did not cause or contribute to the downfall
of the private company, or that compensation may take
place by avoiding particular transactions and that such
compensation is appropriate.
The Supreme Court considered the concept of causing
liability for insolvency in two decisions which it gave in
2004.  In the first of these Autohändler [2005] ZIP 115, the
court found that an indirect shareholder who owned all the
shares in a private company which became insolvent might
be found liable for causing insolvency if he transferred all
its assets to himself or to another company in which he was
a shareholder without furnishing adequate consideration to
the company. A further precondition for imposing
unlimited liability was the impossibility of the company
being compensated by avoiding identifiable individual
transactions.  However, the court held that the shareholder
could limit his liability if he could demonstrate that by
comparing the actual situation of the company with the
hypothetical situation which should have resulted if he had
acted appropriately, the company would have only suffered
a small loss.
The second of these two cases was Unterschlagung [2005]
ZIP 250.  In that case, the court held that the concept of
liability for causing insolvency was not based on
mismanagement, but required the deliberate deprivation of
the assets of the private company for non-operational
purpose.  It found that such interference should be with
assets which were actually available for the satisfaction of
the unsecured creditors in order for liability to be imposed
for causing insolvency.
It appears from the decided cases that there are two
positive conditions for the imposition of such liability.
These two conditions are that the shareholders must
deprive the private company of its assets without full
consideration, and this deprivation must inhibit the ability
of the company to pay its debts.  If a claim for causing
insolvency is brought, this may result in the unlimited
liability of those shareholders who consented to
interference with the company’s assets.
The recently established concept under German law of
unlimited shareholder liability for causing the insolvency of
a private company (Existenzvernichtungshaften) has
undergone recent revision as the result of the important
judgment of the Supreme Court in 2007 in Trihotel (II ZR
3/04).  The Court held that such shareholder liability
would in principle only be towards the company itself, and
not its creditors.  It would be based upon Article 826 of the
German Civil Code, which provides for delictual liability
for damage cause intentionally and in violation of good
moral behaviour.  The requirement mentioned in earlier
cases that unlimited shareholder liability is only imposed if
the loss cannot be recovered in accordance with paragraphs
30 and 31 GmbHG will no longer be applicable.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The approach of the German Supreme Court to de facto
groups in which a private company is the dependent
company has fluctuated in recent years to a greater extent
than that to contractual groups of a similar kind.  It is
difficult to say whether the development of the law
regarding the former type of groups is now at an end.  This
development has been rendered necessary by reason of the
fact that the government draft project of 1973
(Regierungsentwurf) of 1973 was never enacted.  The
apparent abandonment of the concept of the qualified de
facto group is somewhat surprising.  It may have been
occasioned partly by the fact that it was thought difficult to
distinguish such groups from other de facto groups.
Furthermore, it may also have been thought by some that
the use of the above mentioned concept had led to too
dynamic an approach to the development of the law (note
in this regard, Kübler and Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht, 6th
ed, Müller 2006,  p 456). 
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